Religion and Politics

According to the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), Syrian women are happy that men will no longer be the only gender occupying the position of mufti. In June, according to IWPR, Arabic-language news sites reported that Grand Mufti Ahmed Badreddin Hassoun “announced that female graduates of Islamic law colleges are being trained to become muftis who will counsel women on religious matters.” The IWPR Report “Women Want Female Muftis,” also reported that Hasun “made it clear that female muftis would be appointed to the Iftaa Council,” which can issue fatwahs (religious edicts). According to Alarabiya.net, Hassoun said, “The Prophet allowed women to issue fatwas and used to refer women to come to him and consult his wife Aisha.” In Al Arabiya’s report, “Women Train to be Muftis in Syria,” an Islamic studies teacher, Hoda Habash was quoted as saying that this new initiative would be a step towards recognizing women’s issues. Another great interesing link on Alarabiya.net about Sheikh Ahmad Badreddin Hassoun is the article, “Syrian Grand Mufti Says he is Sunni and Shiite.” The highest jurist of Islamic law in Syria said that he felt affiliated to all the different denominations of Islam and that there’s only one Islam – with no real contradictions between being Sunni or Shiite. He also argued (this was in a speech before the German parliament) that Holy Wars usually serve political ends only.  

Several posts on this blog have discussed the place of dialogue and cultural understanding in world politics, specifically in the context of religion. Recently, a newsletter of the Organization for Defending Victims of Violence (ODVV is an Iranian human rights organization) raised the question of Islamic Feminism. In this regard, Hiba Arshad, the author of a paper on this topic, was cited by ODVV and writes, “there is an incredible need for understanding and cultural dialogue to take place in order to foster understanding and build peaceful relationships with the civilizations of the world.” Arshad’s short paper analyzes Islamic feminism in the context of UNESCO but first takes a general-historical approach and breaks down feminist movements in Islam into three categories: Islamic feminists, Muslim feminists, and Islamist feminists. The author says that “Islamists are advocates of a political Islam, the notion that the Qur’an can mandate an Islamic government; they advocate women’s rights in the public sphere but do not challenge gender inequality in the personal, private sphere.” The Islamic feminist movement, however, is allegedly the most dominant. Arshad further discusses the current trend for women scholars of Islam to read the Qur’an in such a way that it is female inclusive. Amina Wadud, an American convert to Islam, who wrote, “Quran and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Women’s Perspective” is an example of this new approach. Arshad poignantly concludes by writing “that the prominent political discourse is a speech that generates fear and stereotypes”.

This past Thursday, there was a deadly bomb attack in the Philippines. Three people were killed outside an Air Force base. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) – the largest Muslim rebel group in the Philippines – denied any involvement in the attack but was accused by the regional police chief. There are other Muslim armed groups like the Abu Sayyaf, which could have been involved in the bombing. Peace monitors arrived in 2004, which “reduced the level of violence to nearly zero.” Conversely, rebel negotiators walked away in December from a meeting that was part of peace talks that began in 1997. One of the main questions is finding a joint “determination of the scope of the Muslim homeland” in the Philippines, while there has been fighting for a separate Islamic state since the 1970s. Carlos H. Conde points out in the New York Times that a peace deal might be difficult to reach when the state cannot constitutionally hand over sovereign rights to territory.

This past week, the former top Muslim insurgent – Nur Misuari – said that the Muslim National Liberation Front (MNLF) should abide by a 1996 agreement with the national government. Agence France Press reported that Misuari said that if the government failed to give the full autonomy the group was seeking, then they would march for peace. Misuari said he would work for a federal form of government with four states. To date, approximately 120,000 people have been killed, and about 2 million people were displaced in the Philippines. Despite these statistics, President Arroyo has spoken extensively about peace building and the role of dialogue. She has said, “I have personally advanced the process of peace in Muslim and Christian Mindanao to a new level of engagement, focused on interfaith dialogue, economic development and mutual security.”

After the riots in the French suburbs in 2007 (not to mention 2005), Olivier Roy – an expert on Islam and politics – said, “what these guys want is integration.” In a presentation of his book (published the same year), Secularism Confronts Islam, Olivier Roy discussed the “tools” of integration. With respect to the situation in Holland, Roy said, “After 9/11, after the assassination of Theo Van Gogh, suddenly there is a feeling in Europe that [assimilation and multiculturalism], in fact did fail. That multiculturalism is not working or is heading towards very negative side effects, and on the other hand, assimilation in France has created problems – not created, but has opened the door for polemics about what is the place, what is the role for religion in the French public place.”

 This month, Human Rights Watch has released a report titled “The Netherlands: Discrimination in the Name of Integration.”  The research looks at measures instituted by the authorities in the Netherlands “with the stated aim of better integrating its migrant population.” One of the measures is the overseas integration test, which aims to have new immigrants integrate into the Dutch culture before arriving in Holland. The test primarily targets the migrants from two of the three largest immigrant communities in Holland – Moroccans and Turks. These communities have specifically been under greater pressure because of allegations that they do not integrate. “The main targets for these attacks have been Muslim communities, especially Turks and Moroccans.” Human Rights Watch has found that the integration test is discriminatory on the grounds that it is not required from all immigrant communities and the costs of taking the test abroad may pose an excessive financial burden (indirect discrimination). 

A classic example of the complex dynamics surrounding an “Islamic” party in a secular state is Turkey and the AKP (The Justice and Development Party), which has spent most of its recent political clout trying to remove the headscarf ban in universities. The Eurasia Daily Monitor (Jamestown Foundation) has recently reported on research that shows “Turks are becoming more pessimistic and introspective.” The article reflects on the decline of support for the AKP and the supposed “deep divisions in Turkish society over the future of secularism.” Apparently, “only 5.2% of AKP supporters were concerned that secularism was in danger.”

A second example of a secular state, which faces questions about the legitimate role of its religious political parties, is Tajikistan. This less-developed country (rarely discussed in world politics) prides itself on the open inclusion of the “Party of the Islamic Revival/Renaissance of Tajikistan” (also known as PIRT). Tajikistan perpetually claims the status of “most-democratic country in Central Asia” simply because the PIRT is active and openly challenges government policies and agenda items. This past week, in Tajikistan, at the National Center for Strategic Research, there was a presentation of a new book by Abdullo Rakhnamo, “Religious Parties and Secular Governments.” Rakhnamo has recently said during an interview that the legal functioning of the PIRT is “one of the most important components of the Tajik peace process.” His book focuses on the role of religious parties in maintaining equilibrium in developing political systems – helping to create “a culture of stability” leading to compromise and the furtherance of the rule of law.

This is a Guest Blog written by Zharmukhamed Zardykhan, an Assistant Professor at KIMEP, the Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics, and Strategic Research.

  The First World War was noted not only for its horrific physical destruction and tremendous financial ruin, but for the first time systematic international propaganda became one of the most effective means of warfare.

The incorporation of the notion of jihâd into wartime propaganda had already gained strength during the Balkan Wars and, in fact, did not slacken its pace up until the First World War. Indeed, the very notion of warfare, whether offensive or defensive, obtained a certain character in traditional Islam and its interpretation, depending on whose part it is conducted, so that, according to Ibn Khaldûn, any warfare conducted by Muslims, including an offensive one, is not only legitimate, but also a holy war, or jihâd, since in the long run it undertakes a mission of leading the world population to Islamic faith. (1) However, the long-established Turkic and Anatolian tradition established a difference between jihâd and ghâzâ, referring, respectively, to the defense of Muslim lands against the aggression of infidel troops and to the actual invasion of infidel lands by Muslim troops empowered by the Caliph. (2)

But what about the Ottoman proclamations for jihâd during the First World War? The traditional appeals to fight down the infidels would not work because of the German troops fighting alongside of Ottomans. The appeals to resist the enslavers and suppressors of Muslim populations would be impeded by Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian participation in the Great War on the side of the Central Powers. Furthermore, throughout the First World War, the Ottoman troops had to stand against fellow Muslim soldiers among the Russian, British or French troops.

Here comes the Ottoman fatwâ, the religious edict issued by Ottoman şeyh-ül-islâm Ürgüplü Hayrî Efendî that justified the religious and spiritual grounds of war. Structured in the traditional Ottoman pattern, this fetvâ-i şerîf (3) contained five issues [mes’ele] concerning different features of the war and answers to them [el-cevâb]. In brief, the fetvâ-i şerîf assured that: (1) at the time when Islam is assaulted and Islamic population is threatened by annihilation and imprisonment, the physical and material contribution of every Muslim to the holy war is an individual and unavoidable obligation [farz-i ‘ayn]; (2) it is an obligation [farz] for the Muslim population of Russia, Britain and France to declare jihâd against these governments and actually joint it; (3) even if they were threatened by death or the extermination of their families, fighting against the soldiers of the Islamic Government [i.e. Ottoman State] is absolutely forbidden [harâm-i kat’î] by religious law and the infringers would be thrown to infernal fire [nâr-i cahîm]; (4) the fighting of the Muslim subjects of Britain, France, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro against Germany and Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman allies, would harm the Islamic Caliphate and those who fought would suffer grievous wrath [gazâb-i elîm].

Similarly, upon the Ottoman engagement into the First World War, numerous articles on the nature of jihâd and its place and justification by the Islamic law started appearing in Ottoman periodical press. As “Religion and War” acknowledged thoroughly using quotations from Qur’ân, “the Muslims do not fight for personal and arbitrary causes,” while jihâd is bound to the greater cause and is both permitted and obligatory.(4) At the same time, the outburst of the war came out as an opportunity to strengthen the image of the Caliphate not only outside, but also within the Empire, as did “What Kind of a Caliph the Enemies of the Caliphate Want?” by stating that “the Caliphate of Islam is not a weak [kuvvetsiz] and humble [şevketsiz] institution like the Papacy that only has religious guardianship and spiritual governance.”(5)

[1] See Abu-Sahlieh, Sami A. Adeeb. “The Islamic Conception of Migration.” International Migration Review 30, No. 1 (Spring 1996): 37-57.[2] See Darling, Linda. “Contested Territory: Ottoman Holy War in Comparative Context.”Studia Islamica No. 91 (2000): 133-163.[3] For the text of the fatwâ see “Fetâvâ-i Şerîfe,” Cihân-i İslâm, No. 50; and “Fetâvâ-i Şerîfe,” Donanma, No. 68-20 (16 Teşrîn-i sânî 1914).[4] “Dîn ve Harb,” İslâm Mecmû’ası, Year 2, No. 42 (7 Djumâdâ ‘l-Ûlâ 1334) [1916].[5] “Hilâfet Düsmânları Nâsıl Bir Halife İstiyor?” İslâm Mecmû’ası, Year 2, No. 46 (9 Dhu l’-Ka’da 1334) [1916].